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commonpractice is to vary emission standards in line with this relation,
allowing larger plants to pollute more than small ones so as to constrain
every plant to emissions proportionally below the uncontrolled level.
The standards are designed to force firms to adopt the more expensive
control devices presently manufactured for each scale of output. This
practice could be optimal economically in the special case where plants
regardless of size are forced to equally high marginal costs of control
and where damages from an extra pound of smoke are the same regard.
less of plant size. While the special case is probably never encountered
exactly, the common practice is almost surely more optimal than setting
standards invariant to scale.
e For automobiles, the tax on leaded gasoline, requirement of catalytic
mufflers, and emission standards or tests for cars, are examples of fuel
e input, control devices and emission policies. Limiting auto use in central
business districts is an output policy, specifically restricting auto travel
output.
n The static case considered in this section provides a starting point for
s dynamic extensions in which policy costs are conceived as a present value.
In view of incentives to move toward new factor combinations, enhanced
e inducements to discovery will lead to research and development responses
to policies neglected in previous estimates of costs. Since substitutions
depend on the wearing out of equipment, the optimal timing of pollu-
(S tion reduction depends on capital replacement decisions. Capital replace-
ment analysis is needed for variances granted in judicial and administra-
tive proceedings that allow delay in meeting standards. London laws
banning coal in space heating provide examples of input policies with
dynamic dimensions. Coal has been declining as a household fuel due
to relative cost changes. Replacement of existing furnaces determines the
timing. Part of the costs of reducing coal air pollutants is the present




1 The production functions considered so far have included equation (2)
is y =y(z,q) explaining the output of commodities affected by pollution,
equation (8) x =x(u,f)explainingoutput of commodities whose pro-
duction causes pollution and equation (11) s =s(f,c) explaining pollu-
tion emissions. The system is completed by another production function
= ...,sn), (17)
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showing how pollution emissions are transformed into changes in the
public good causing pollution damages. This function differs for air,
water and solid wastes, and for pollutants within any one of the waste
forms. It can indicate how treatment facilities affect q anti how emissions
s at one time affect the public good at later times. For the air pollution
examples in this paper, (17) is an air dispersion model. As will be shown
later, the effect of an emission s, on air quality q, within (he same shed
varies depending on the location of jandi.
If there is only one x and y producer each or if producers are identical
with no locational differentiation within the shed, (17) reduces to q =
q(s).This equation can be used in expressions for y benefits such as (5)
and (6) to replace q with s. One obtains benefits from y as a function of
s which can be compared with the benefits from x as a function of s de-
riveci in the preceding section. In Figure 3, the y benefits as a function
of s reach a maximum to the left of the maximum for the x good. Pro-
ceeding from the y maximum, the marginal y benefits are negative as s
increases. The marginal y benefits with changed sign are marginal costs
which may be plotted in the same quadrant as the marginal benefits
from x. The marginal cost schedule is upward sloping and crosses the
marginal benefit schedule for x still to the left of Sm.Ifthe two marginal c
schedules are linear, the gain from moving from the free market situation
to the maximum net benefit point, saywhere the two marginal
benefit schedules cross, is the area between the schedules or —[b(y)88m]2/
2{b(y)898—b(x)888],where b(y)88m is the y benefit from a unit increase in
emissions at the free market level. The foregoing gain is the maximum
potential gain from an environmental policy. Solving for the level of
emissions where marginal benefits equal marginal costs and subtracting
from free market emissions gives reduction in emissions necessary to
achieve the maximum gain.
Absolutely inferior
If emissions are reduced beyond what is necessary to achieve the maxi-
mum gain, a levelwill eventually be reached below which net benefits
are less than at the free market level. With linearity, the critical emission
reduction is twice the reduction necessary for maximum potential gain, or
Sm— T —b(x),,'], (18)
that is, twice the marginal effect of emissions on y benefits at the freeRESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 157
market divided by the sum of the slopes of the marginal schedules.
Nonlinearities might increase negatively on the slope of the marginal
benefits schedule for y at higher emissions and increasing marginal costs
of control for x at lower emissions. Since the nonlinearities have oppo-
site effects onandthey could conceivably be offsetting. These con-
siderations indicate information needed to eliminate policies, that may
be put forth in the course of policy deliberations, which are worse than
rio policy.
Waste interfaces
An illustration brings out the economics of the much discussed possi-
bility that reduction of one externality may increase another. Suppose a
choice is being made whether to get rid of garbage by incinerator or
landfill. Direct costs per ton of garbage are $10 for incineration and $6
for landfill. To estimate external costs, suppose the volume to be handled
of 500 tons per day, if incinerated, would result in 10 tons per clay of
particulate emissions. If damages from the particulates increase by $10,000
for each increase of one ton in daily particulate emissions, the external
cost of the incinerator is $100,000 per year. Assuming a total of 125,000
tons are handled during a year, the external cost for incineration is $.80
per ton of garbage. A landfill will impose external costs on surrounding
residences due to unsightliness, smell and noise. For this volume of waste,
assume a landfill would impose an average property volume loss of $2,000
on 1,000 residences or $2 million capital loss which implies a yearly loss
of perhaps $200,000. The external costs for landfill are then $1.60 per
ton. Direct plus external costs per ton are $10.80 for incineration and
$7.60 for landfill. The external costs do not reverse the ranking based
on direct costs in this example, but, of course, they ought in other cases.
The landfill with external costs concentrated on a few residences in a
vocal outlying community, might generate greater public opposition than
the incinerator causing the landfill to be rejected in spite of its cost ad-
vantage. Requiring one payment for all compensation could make in-
centives of damagers and damagees coincide with incentives to maximize
net benefits. If compensation of $2 million to surrounding property own-
ers were required on opening the landfill (and likewise compensation to
those damaged by air pollution were required if the incinerator were
built) the external costs would be borne by those disposing of wastes.
The damaged parties being fully compensated would lose their economic




Within a metropolitan area, identical polluters cause different damages.
Figure 4 shows SO2 changes within the Chicago area that would result
from a new power plant. The damages from the plant depend on densi-
ties of activity along each isopleth. Locating the plant differently would
Figure 4
increase in SO2 Levels from a New Generating Plant
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changethe isopleths leading to different damages. In outlying low den-
sity areas, the damages would be smaller.
Imposing uniform restrictions on emissions regardless of location im-
poses identical control on different externalities. All the current policies
mentioned in the section on pollution control costs have this defect.
Control may result in positive net benefits for some sources, while for
other sources emissions are restricted belowwith control costing more
than worth. If quantitative restrictions are to be used, a case can be
made for administrative or court regulation set case by case according
to damages, rather than having a uniform emission standard. A uniform
tax on emissions also imposes identical incentives on different exter-
nalities. To avoid the uniformity losses, the tax rate on emissions should
vary at different points in the city. Salable emission rights also encounter
the problem. If sales of rights to emit were allowed unrestricted within
the metropolitan area, their trading value would tend to be the same as
the tax necessary to attain the same level of emissions. With salable
emission rights, transfer fees or rebates might be desirable equal to dif-
ferences in damages caused by a change in the location of emissions.
Uniformity losses could be restricted by establishing zones within
cities, within which uniform incentives would be imposed. Zoning could
avoid a failure, possible under the foregoing policies, to find gains from
eliminating pollution from some areas altogether. Joe Reid has empha-
sized the implications of nonconvexities, indicating a formal case for
zoning to exclude some types of pollution altogether if the marginal
damages are decreasing rather than increasing. The stability conditions
are then violated, and the market—or policies trying to correct the mai-
ket marginally—may find a local polluting optimum where net benefits
are less than with no pollution. The normal concave situation of increas-
ing marginal damages probably applies to materials damages and health.
The convexity argument applies to esthetic and recreational uses of land,
whereby a little bit of blight is sufficient to reduce drastically the bene-
fits and with further blight not having much effect after the initial
pafl.
None of the policies mentioned so far avoids the free rider problems
of getting people to bid either for reduced pollution or for the genera-
tion of knowledge about health and other adverse effects of pollution.
Schemes have been proposed, so far at an abstract level, for including
people to reveal their preferences for a public good by making the supply
curve facing them be the actual supply curve less other people's bids
(Clarke, Tideman). These schemes face the same problems connected
with nonuniformities as do other policies.160 GEORGETOLLEY
The issue of losses from uniformity extends beyond spatial variation
within one metropolitan area. When the wind is blowing and the
weather is mild, reducing demand for fuels for heating, the marginal
damage caused by a given level of emissions may be small, in contrast
to great damages in still, cold weather, and even greater damages during
an inversion. If a single emission standard must be observed at all times,
as most plans require, different external costs are being treated alike over
time as well as over space. Emergency measures required during episodes
are a step in the direction of recognizing uniformity losses.
Administrative costs and regulatory behavior partly determine how
much uniformity should be imposed, but the benefits and costs being
considered in this paper also influence the choice. Because there are costs
of varying the level of emissions, particularly if plants must be shut down
for temporary periods, the maximization of net benefits does not call for
instantaneous adjustment of emissions to every change in external costs.
The uniformity issue is particularly severe for automobiles in view of
the variability in their emission damages with weather and traffic. While
the costs of instantaneous adjustments appear prohibitive, the current
legislative approach aiming to require the same control at all times every-
where maximizes uniformity losses. Preliminary results by Richard Zerbe
suggest promise for varying standards by area and other intermediate
strategies.
Location of Industry in Different Parts of the Country
Applying the same emission standard everywhere in the nation carries
uniformity losses to a maximum. Costs for areas where emissions are
reduced below 7 could exceed gains for areas of positive net benefits. If
an industry's production costs are not very different among locations,
shifts toward areas of low damage may be cheaper than relying solely on
control in place. One of the least costly ways to reduce pollution losses
could be to induce a different locational pattern. At odds with this idea
is current legislation, which aims to freeze location. Standards for new
plants are the same everywhere and are more stringent than for existing 4
plants,impeding even normal locational adjustment.
While prominent in classic externality discussions (Coase, Pigou) spa-
tial considerations have not been fully resolved partly because of need
to more adequately consider land. The usual conclusion that a quanti-
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isvalid only if he stays in business at the same location. Consider the bid
for an industrial site by a polluter. He will have higher profits with a
quantitative restriction on emissions requiring no payments, than he will
with necessity to pay an emissions tax, even though the two forms of
control induce the same emissions reduction if he produces at the site.
With the quantitative restriction he can bid more for the site and is more
likely to bid out competing users. To foster optimum allocation, it ap-
pears his tax payments should equal total damages imposed making his
bid correctly reflect x-beneflts less y-losses. In deciding where to locate,
externalities will then be internalized.
One pitfall to avoid is levying only a marginal tax rate. If an emission
tax ratemade equal to marginal damages caused by a pound of pol-
lutant, the total tax paid will equal total damages only if marginal and
average damages are equal. If the idea is correct that marginal tends to
be above average damages, the tax collected would be greater than total
damages calling for a lump sum rebate. Under any policy, there may be
a difference between marginal payments for emissions and the damages
caused. As another example, under an emission standard marginal pay-
ments are zero. A general rule is to make lump sum rebate (or tax) equal
to the difference between the sum of marginal payments and the total
damages caused.
Payments by polluters should be coupled either with no compensation
to those damaged (Baumol) or more equitably one payment for all corn-
pensateci. As applied to land values, with no compensation, external costs
will cause negative windfalls to owners of land on which external costs
are borne, and taxpayers will gain the proceeds of the tax. With com-
pensation, there need be no such wealth transfer. The present value of
the damages is transferred from polluters to owners of affected land ex-
actly offsetting the loss in sale value of their land due to the damages.
Note that compensation is not related marginally to damages and is to
be paid to land owners, not land users. If frequent compensation is ex-
pected and if land owners can manage to have excessive losses incurred
on which to base the compensations, the expectation of compensations
might conceivably induce nonoptimal use of land on which damages oc-
cur. However, the idea of deciding land use for expected compensation
ignoring market revenues seems somewhat far fetched, and the practice
would be limited by abilities of outside adjudicators to verify gross cases
of excessive losses.
\Arith agreement that the foregoing norms would induce optimal ad-
justment to pollution, estimates of costs of departures from them could162 GEORGETOLLEY
be made. This requires comparing locational differences in costs of pol.
luting production with differences in damages, a job in which little
progress has yet been made.
Conclusion
Any environmental policy instrument reduces pollution damages through
some combination of reducing emission producing inputs, installing pol-
lution control devices, reducing product output or changing the location
of activities. This paper has examined benefits and costs for these dimen-
sions. Instead of seeking a single best instrument the approach has been
to compare alternatives, recognizing that resource allocation is not the
sole consideration in environmental policy. Yet the very reason for con-
cern with the environment is to correct resource allocation failures. Re-
source allocation is more important in environmental policy than in
many other policy areas.
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COMMENT
Gardner Brown, Jr., University of Washington
It is common knowledge that the best level of pollution occurs when the
marginal damage of pollution offsets the marginal cost of an action
which reduces pollution. This rule can be characterized either graphi-
cally or mathematically. The first sections of George Tolley's paper pro-
vide us with an original treatment of some thorny conceptual issues in-
volved in identifying these functions.
It is also true that goods or bads, as the case may be, have a space and
time dimension. Carrots from the San Joaquin valley differ in a funda-
mental economic sense from carrots from Chicago, and the economic
value of a given environmental quality level in New York City only
fortuitously is the same as the level in the desert region of Utah. There-
fore, most would agree that a uniform air or water quality standard is
not likely to make economic sense. The fourth and fifth sections of the
paper discuss the effects of uniformity, those heavy-handed environmental
policies which fail to recognize the spatial and temporal characteristics
of bads.164 GEORGETOLLEY
The necessary ingredients for evaluating alternative environmental
policies are benefit and cost functions. In too many publications, empiri-
cal benefit functions capture the value of changes in environmental qua]-
ity by looking only at changes in the total expenditures of variable
factors. Such estimates are conceptually biased, since changes in environ-
mental quality impinge on the value of producers' and consumers' sur-
pluses, necessary elements in the true estimate of net benefits. For plausi.
ble values of the elasticities of demand and supply the bias is shown to
be significant. Tolley's main contribution here is to treat households as
firms after the fashion of Becker.
Turning next to loss functions, the analysis begins with single product
profit maximization in an environment where pollution occurs but vol- ¶
untaryregulation is ruled out. The first point of departure assumes a
control policy on emissions. Since the control policy is
wise why have it?—benefits are reduced compared to the unregulated
market outcome, reduced by the marginal cost of control. Labels may be
misleading. The focus is on the production of conventional goods in
combination with bads. Forcing firms to produce less bads increases their
costs, referred to in the text as change in benefits. It should be empha-
sized that the author is not here discussing what is commonly referred
to in the literature as the benefit or damage reduction function.
The regulator's second policy alternative involves the choice of a level
of control inputs. It is exemplified by the prescription: Use secondary
treatment in the case of water quality management. For any given level
of control input, the optimal level of the pollution intensive input will
be greater in the second policy relative to the first unless it is in a world
of fixed factor proportions. As long as factor substitution is technically
feasible, policy two is second best, involving greater private costs for any
given initial level.
A third policy requires regulating the level of the pollution intensive
input, while the fourth policy entails controlling emissions by using a
final output level.
Emission regulation is superior to all other policies because the en- sj
trepreneur is left with more choice. He can select best values for x, f, vi
and u whereas with the remaining policies, one of the first three variables
is exogenously determined. Tolley proves that policy three, restricting
pollution intensive inputs, is superior to the output restriction policy
four after assuming a constant marginal benefit (loss) function and a spe-
cific form for the emission relation (11). The same conclusion holds much
more generally. The policy which has the flattest marginal benefit func-RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 165
tion(3) is best. Therefore, if the fuel restriction policy is better than re-
stricting output,
< 1,
where b(x)88 is the slope of the marginal benefit function. Since
=(1/S,2)(M/M11), (15f)
b(X)saZ= (15x)
using the original notation, then
M2 = xf< I
or
— > 0.
• One can show that this expression indeed is positive by computing its
value from the determinant exhibited above (11) in the original paper.
The only requirement is that the production function is concave.
Regrettably, a complete general ranking does not seem possible since
the virtues of the fuel policy (3) relative to the fixed control expenditures
policy (2) depend on the choice of elasticities and parameter values.
The last pages of Tolley's paper discuss some of the problems which
arise when a uniform policy is applied to an area or time period in which
the net benefit function varies. Uniformity of pollution policy is expen-
• sive because no longer are there incentives to make intertemporal pro-
duction adjustments or substitutions from a region of high opportunity
cost to one of low opportunity cost of pollution.
Zoning and salable rights are additional tools available to policy mak-
ers. As the author rightly emphasizes, if the rights are not well-defined in
space, the rights will be distributed inappropriately unless exchange in-
volving spatial transfer is accompanied by a charge which reflects spatial
opportunity cost differences.
This section offers fertile ground for other investigators to till. To cite
one example, suppose meteorology was a fine-tuned science enabling us
to predict weather with certainty. Suppose weather changes affect the net
benefit pollution function and policy-makers had chosen a policy of charg-
ing for emissions. What is the optimal rate of price change? Surely econo-RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 167
Somemay wish to argue that Tolley cast his net in too modest an arc.
I would argue that even artificially simple but sound approaches are
meritorious because they place in bold perspective crucial relationships
which may change only in degree when a more encompassing model is
developed. Understanding of the complex generally proceeds from a deep
appreciation of the less complex to which this paper is a contribution.
Tolley is engaged in a substantial research project on environmental
quality. This paper probably can be regarded as an interim report in
which the author spells out the analytical framework of the larger study.
Some of the topics are better developed than others, leaving the reader
with an impression of rugged terrain rather than a polished surface.
Nevertheless, the paper is a provocative and original contribution to the
literature on environmental quality and bears the imprint of an insight.
ful innovative mind. With this paper as openers, I'd bet heavily on the
final study.
.1